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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the mid-1990s Mr. John Bushnell went through a difficult divorce. As a result

of that difficult divorce, Mr. Bushnell fell behind on paying his taxes and filing his tax
returns. In January 2005, after putting his life back together, Mr. Bushnell desired to
become current with the IRS. He began by organizing his documents and contacting the
IRS to prepare and file prior year tax returns from 1997 through 2003. (R.436 at 493).
4
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Mr. Bushnell hired a bookkeeper, Denise Naylor, to organize his receipts, bank
statements, copies of checks, and other financial documents. (Id; R. 437 at 611). At Mr.
BushneH's request, the IRS sent him records relating to his tax returns for the years 1997
through 2003. Once Mr. Bushnell had the information from the IRS, and his documents
had been organized and placed into the software program Quicken, he needed a certified
public accountant ("CPA") to prepare the returns and perhaps negotiate with the IRS.
Mr. Bushnell turned to Dale K. Barker, P.C (hereinafter "Barker") to complete those final
tasks. Mr. Dale K. Barker, Jr. of Dale K. Barker, P.C. met with Mr. Bushnell, and Ms.
Naylor. After listening to what needed to be done, Mr. Barker stated that he was an
expert at dealing with the IRS and estimated that it would cost approximately $15,000 to
prepare and file the past tax returns and negotiate with the IRS. (R.436 at 498-99; R437
at 614). Even though the estimate seemed high to prepare seven tax returns, Mr.
Bushnell decided that he needed to hire someone who was as experienced as Mr. Barker
represented himself to be. (R.436 at 499-500). Unfortunately, Mr. BushnelPs reliance
upon the expertise of Barker would prove misplaced, as Barker would create much more
work than was needed, would pick fights with the IRS agents, would miss deadlines
agreed upon with the IRS Agents, and would charge Mr. Bushnell over $51,675.20l for

1

The total invoice amount billed to Mr. Bushnell was $19,000.00 and the total invoice
amount billed to Bushnet was $45,355.20. However, the invoice amount billed to
Bushnet included a charge for $12,680.20 for a payment of taxes made by Barker to the
5
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the work he requested. After a year of unnecessary delays, fights with the IRS, and overbilling, Mr. Bushnell found a new CPA and hired an attorney to dispute Barker's bill.
After a few failed settlement attempts with Barker, Plaintiff/Appellant Dale K. Barker,
P.C. initiated this action by filing a Complaint against Defendants/Appellees John
Bushnell ("Bushnell") and Bushnet, P.C. ("Bushnett") for breach of contract.
Defendant/Appellee John Bushnell brought a counter-claim against Barker for breach of
contract and a third-party complaint against Mr. Barker personally for malpractice. After
four days of trail before Judge Fratto, the Court found that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had
not breached their contracts with Barker, and further found that it was Barker who had
breached the contract with Mr. Bushnell. The Court awarded Mr. Bushnell nominal
damages and his costs and attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract.
H.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS REVIEW
The Trial Court found the following facts after the close of trial. (R. 460 -65)
1.

In the Spring of 2005, Mr. Bushnell had not filed tax returns from 1997

through 2003, nor had he paid taxes for the years 1995 through 2003.
2.

Dale K. Barker, P.C. is an accounting firm located in Salt Lake City, Utah.

IRS in behalf of John Bushnell personally. As explained below in footnote four, the
billings to Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet are treated as one by Mr. Bushnell due to the fact
that the billings to Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were comingled by Barker, as evidenced by
inclusion on Bushnet's bill of the $12,680.20 payment made in behalf of Mr. Bushnell
personally. (See infra note 4)
6
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3.

Dale K. Barker, Jr. ("Dale Barker") is a certified public accountant.

4.

In April 2005, Mr. Bushnell met with Dale Barker of Dale K. Barker, P.C.

to discuss Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's tax returns for 1997 through 2003, and the
money he owed to the IRS for the years 1995 through 2003.
5.

In that meeting, Mr. Barker told Mr. Bushnell that he was an expert at

dealing with situations such as this and in negotiating with the IRS.
6.

Dale K. Barker, P.C. and John Bushnell entered into a Services Agreement

on or about April 28, 2005, wherein "Barker agree[d] to perform... [a]ll requested
services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and
implied."
7.

Barker and Bushnet, P.C. entered into a Services Agreement on, or about,

September 15, 2005 wherein "Barker agree[d] to perform... [a]ll requested services as set
forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and implied."
8.

The parties agreed that the task to be performed by Barker was to prepare

the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet and to negotiate the payment amounts
with the IRS, if necessary.
9.

Other than the general agreement of the task to be performed by Barker

under the Services Agreement, established by parole evidence at trial, the Services
Agreement does not specifically indicate what work must be performed by Barker, nor

7
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does it indicate the amount that must be paid for work performed.
10.

Because there is no definite understanding as to what work must be done,

and taking into consideration that the contract was drafted by Barker and was not
negotiated at arm's length, the trial court applied a reasonable and necessary standard to
determine whether the work done by Barker was required under the contract.
11.

On April 28, 2005, or shortly thereafter, Mr. Bushnell provided to Mr.

Barker a disk that had all of his financial information for the years 1997 through 2004
organized in the program "Quicken."
12.

Notwithstanding the financial information organized in the "Quicken"

program, Barker requested that Mr. Bushnell provide to him all of his financial
information from the years 1997 through 2003.
13.

Shortly after the request was made by Barker, Mr. Bushnell provided to

Barker numerous boxes containing all of Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's financial
information for the years 1997 through 2003.
14.

Although Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's information was organized in the

"Quicken" program, Barker took it upon itself to prepare a compilation of the financial
information.
15.

The trial court reviewed the compilations that were done by Barker, the

records from which they were produced, and the information contained in the "Quicken"

8
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program. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that the compilation was
not reasonable and necessary in order to accomplish the tasks required by the contract.
16.

Shortly after the Services Agreement was signed by the parties, Mr.

Bushnell signed a power of attorney ("POA") so that Mr. Barker could speak to the IRS
in his behalf.
17.

After the POA was executed, Mr. Barker contacted the IRS and entered into

an agreement that Mr. Bushnell would pay the amounts owing for the years 1995 and
1996 immediately, and agreed to have Mr. Bushnell's returns from 1998 through 2003
filed with the IRS by June 24, 2005.
18.

Barker did not file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 1998 through

2003 by June 24, 2005, nor had Barker prepared Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years
1998 through 2003 by June 24, 2005.
19.

On June 24, 2005, or shortly thereafter, Mr. Barker spoke with the IRS to

request an extension to file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for 1998 through 2003. Mr. Barker
and the IRS agent agreed that the tax returns would be filed by August 19, 2005.
20.

Barker did not file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 1998 through

2003 by August 19, 2005, nor had Barker prepared Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the
years 1998 through 2003 by August 19, 2005.
21.

Barker did not contact the IRS agent to inform her that the tax returns

9
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would not be filed by August 19, 2005.
22.

On August 30, 2005 and September 1, 2005, Barker prepared Mr.

BushnelPs tax returns for the years 1998 through 2003.
23.

Barker filed Mr. Bushnell's tax returns on September 16, 2005.

24.

The tax return prepared by Barker for the year 1999 contained a substantial

error where it underreported income in the amount of approximately $45,000.
25.

The tax return prepared by Barker for the year 2004 contained an error

where it classified Bushnet as a Subchapter S corporation, when in fact it had not made
an election to be a Subchapter S.
26.

Barker never made the Subchapter S election for Bushnet, even though he

could have made a late Subchapter S election for Bushnet.
27.

Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had to hire another CPA to correct the problems

made by Barker in preparing the 1999 tax return and the 2004 tax return, and to deal with
the IRS regarding those problems.
28.

After the tax returns were filed, the IRS demanded payment for the

amounts owing.
29.

Barker counseled Mr. Bushnell not to pay the amounts owing until they

could request an abatement of fees.
30.

Due to the nonpayment of the amounts owing, the IRS filed federal tax

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

liens against Mr. Bushnell's property for the tax years 1998, 2000, and 2003.
31.

Barker could have avoided the filing of federal tax liens against Mr.

Bushnell's property.
32.

The filing of federal tax liens against Mr. Bushnell's property caused him

embarrassment, injured his credit rating, and made it difficult for him to secure loans and
otherwise use his property.
33.

On December 30, 2005, Barker filed a request for a Collection Due Process

Hearing in behalf of Mr. Bushnell for issues relating to the collection of taxes owed for
2000, 2003, and 2004. The IRS determined that the request for Collection Due Process
Hearing was not timely filed.
34.

In April 2006, Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship with Barker.

35.

At the time Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship with Barker, Barker

had billed Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet a total of $51,675.20. {See supra note 1).
36.

The billing records show two primary categories of billing: one identified

as "research, conferences, meetings, and correspondences, etc.," and a second identified
as "compilation and write-up work, etc ."
37.

Mr. Bushnell paid $19,819.80 to Barker for its services.2

2

The total payments made by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet equal $32,500, however, that
payment included a payment for $12,680.20 for a payment made by Barker to the IRS in
behalf of John Bushnell personally. As explained below in footnote four, the payments
11
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In addition to the facts set forth above, the following facts are relevant to this review:
38.

During the initial consultation, Mr. Barker gave Mr. Bushnell an estimated

cost of $15,000.00 to prepare the past tax returns, file them with the IRS, and negotiate
down the penalties and interest. (R. 436 at 498-99; R. 437 at 584, 614).
39.
m.

Mr. Bushnell relied upon Barker to prepare his tax returns correctly.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Barker raises six issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court used the correct
legal standard to determine duties and damages under the contract; (2) whether the
evidence supports the finding and conclusion that Defendants did not breach their
contract with Barker; (3) whether the evidence supports the finding and conclusion that
Barker breached its contract with Bushnell; (4) whether the trial court erred in awarding
judgment to Bushnell on claims that had previously been dismissed; (5) whether the trial
court erred in awarding Defendants all of their requested attorney fees; and (6) whether
the trial court erred in awarding Defendants costs in excess of those traditionally allowed
by the court.
As to the first issue, the trial court used the proper legal standard to determine the
parties' duties and obligations under the ambiguous portions of the contract. The
made by Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet are treated as one by Mr. Bushnell due to the fact
that the payments made by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were comingled by Barker, as
evidenced by inclusion on Bushnet's bill of the $12,680.20 payment made in behalf of
Mr. Bushnell personally. {See infra note 4)
12
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Services Agreement does not specify what tasks must be performed by Barker in
completing the tax returns and negotiating with the IRS, nor does the Services Agreement
state the fee that Barker will be paid or the rate at which he will charge for the work
performed. Because the contract is ambiguous as to those points, it was necessary for the
trial court to use a reasonable and necessary standard to determine scope of work to be
performed under the services provision of the contract, and the appropriate amount to be
billed under the fee provision of the contract.
As to the second issue, the evidence properly supports the trial court's finding that
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not breach their contract with Barker. Under the contract,
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had a duty to pay Barker compensation for all services they
requested Barker to perform. Barker and Bushnet requested that Barker prepare the tax
returns for 1997 through 2004 for Mr. Bushnell, and to prepare the tax returns for
Bushnet for 1998 through 2004. Mr. Barker gave Mr. Bushnell an estimate of $15,000 to
perform the work requested. By the time the parties' relationship ended, Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet had paid to Barker approximately $19,819.80 for its services. (See supra
note 2). The evidence presented by Barker established that it had billed Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet over $51,675.20 for its services (see supra note 1); however the evidence did not
establish that the amount billed was for work that was reasonable and necessary to
accomplish the task requested by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet. In fact, the evidence

13
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suggests that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet overpaid for the services they received since the
evidence established, and the trial court found, that Barker had performed unreasonable
and unnecessary services and had failed to competently perform the tasks actually
requested by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet.
As to the third issue, the evidence established, and the trial court found, that
Barker breached its contract with Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet by failing to properly
prepare the tax returns, missing agreed-upon deadlines to file the returns with the IRS,
failing to properly negotiate with the IRS, and advising Mr. Bushnell to not pay the taxes
owed when they were due.
As to the fourth issue, the trial court did not award judgment to Mr. Bushnell on
claims that had previously been dismissed. At the close of Mr. Bushnell's case, Barker
moved to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party action. The trial court dismissed the
third-party action for breach of contract and negligence against Mr. Barker personally
and dismissed the counterclaim against Barker for negligence, but denied the motion to
dismiss as to the counterclaim for breach of contract against Barker. At the close of trial,
the trial court granted relief to Mr. Bushnell under his breach of contract action - - the
action it refused to dismiss. Barker argues that although the cause of action was not
dismissed, the trial court dismissed the grounds for the cause of action. Barker's
argument fails because the trial court did not exclude any of the evidence that had been

14
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presented in support of the breach of contract action, nor did Barker's motion request that
the trial court exclude any of the evidence presented in support of the breach of contract
action. Therefore, at the close of trial, the trial court properly made its ruling based upon
all of the evidence it received through trial.
As to the fifth issue, the trial court did not err in granting Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet all of their attorney fees incurred in connection with resolving the contract
dispute with Barker, including Mr. Bushnell's defense against Barker's breach of contract
action and Mr. Bushnell's prosecution of his breach of contract action against Barker.
The attorney fees awarded by the court are provided for by the unambiguous terms of the
contract between the parties.
As to the sixth issue, the trail court did not err in awarding Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
all of their costs, even those costs which are not ordinarily awarded to the prevailing
party under statute. The contract between the parties unambiguously provides that the
prevailing party is entitled to all of its costs. The trial court properly interpreted the
contract provision; by including the modifying adjective "all" the contract directs that the
prevailing party is entitled to receive all costs incurred in defending the action, not
limited to the costs allowed by statute.
///
///

15
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IV.

MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE
After the trial, Barker filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its judgment

under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure due to "insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet argued that in order to show an insufficiency of the evidence Barker was
required to marshal the evidence. To show that the trial court had sufficient evidence for
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and its Judgment, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
provided a partial marshaling of the facts. The marshaling provided by Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet pointed out evidence that supported the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law and the Judgment, but it did not provide every shred of evidence in
support of the conclusions reached by the Court. Under the Rule, Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet were not required to provide a complete marshalling of the evidence. In this
appeal, Barker has used the partial marshaling presented to the trial court by Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet in place of its own marshaling of the evidence. In many places in its brief,
Barker seems more intent in criticizing the partial marshaling than in showing that it has
marshaled the evidence folly as required by the Rule.
The partial marshaling of the evidence presented by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet to
the trial court does not alleviate Barker's duty to marshal the evidence to this court. Rule
24 governs appellate briefs, and states in pertinent part, that u[a] party challenging a fact

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). Utah Courts have confirmed this requirement, stating that "[i]n order
to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in
support o/the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."
Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., v. Comtrol Inc., 175 P.3d 572, 580 (Utah App. 2007)
(emphasis in original); citing Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004).
"[E]ven where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling ... if a
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely
fact-sensitive, the appellants also have a duty to marshal the evidence." United Park City
Mines Co., v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006);
citing Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004); see also Cache County, v. Beus, 128
P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2005). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified that
[T]he labels given particular issues by courts or counsel are
not determinative. Rather, the critical element triggering the
duty to marshal is factual inquiry. Parties seeking appellate
review must marshal the evidence on those questions that
require substantive factual inquiry, regardless of whether
those questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of
discretion.
United Park City Mines Co., 140 P.3d at 1209.

17
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To properly marshal the evidence, an appellant is required to "present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very finding it resists." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., 175 P.3d at 580;
citing Chen, 100 P.3d 1177. The Utah Court of Appeals has described the marshaling
process as follows:
The process of marshaling is ... fundamentally different from
that of presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party
must temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully
embrace the adversary's position; he or she must play the
devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants must present the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their
case. Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected
facts and excerpts from the record in support of their position.
Nor can they simply restate or review evidence that points to
an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's
finding of fact.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Company v. Graham, 186 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Utah App.
2008); citing Chen, 100 P.3d 1177; see also, United Park City Mines Co., 140P.3dat
1207; Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. Bagley & Company, 182 P.3d 417
(Utah App. 2008) (holding that appellant did not properly marshal the evidence by simply
setting forth the evidence supporting its position, providing the opposition's response to
that evidence, and arguing that the latter was not credible).
Failure to properly marshal the evidence can result in affirmation of the trial
court's findings. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., 175 P.3d at 581; citing Heber City Corp. v.
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Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997); Cache County, 128 P.3d 63. Where the appellant
fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate courts "do not consider those findings
properly challenged and, therefore, assume the evidence supports them." Chen, 100 P.3d
at 1181.
Barker has failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings by failing to present every scrap of evidence in support of the trial court's
findings. Further, Barker fails to use the evidence that was marshaled to properly support
the trial court's findings. In most instances, despite the evidence cited by Barker, it asks
this Court to substitute its conclusions for the conclusions set forth by the trial court.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT USED THE PROPER LEGAL STANDARD TO
INTERPRET THE PARTIES5 CONTRACT
At trial, the parties disputed their duties and obligations under the contract.

(R4651J38).
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are
controlling. John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743
P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If the contract is in writing and
the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties
must be determined from the words of the agreement. See
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987); Oberhanslv v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah
1977). A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after
careful consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or
uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983).
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
19
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The trial court found that Barker and Bushnell "entered into a Services Agreement on
or about April 28, 2005, wherein 'Barker agree[d] to perform ... [a]ll requested services
as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and
implied.'" (R. 461 ^6). The trial court also found that Bushnet and Barker "entered into
a Services Agreement on or about September 15, 2005, wherein 'Barker agree[d] to
perform ... [a]ll requested services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker
either express, written, or/and implied.'" (R.461 f7). The trial court found that the parties
had a general agreement that the tasks to be performed under the contract by Barker were
to prepare the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, and to negotiate the payment
amounts with the IRS if necessary. (R.4611J8). The trial court concluded that although
the tasks to be performed were generally understood by both parties, the contracts were
ambiguous in that "other than the general agreement of the task to be performed by
Barker under the Services Agreement, the Services Agreement does not specifically
indicate which work must be performed by Barker, nor does it indicate the amount that
must be paid for the work performed." (R.461^|9).
Barker claims that it was legal error for the court to conclude that the language of the
contract was ambiguous as to the tasks that needed to be performed and the amount that
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would be paid to Barker. (Appellant Br. at l). 3 Barker argues that the contract was clear
because the parties agreed upon the tasks that were to be performed by Barker. Barker
posits that a services contract need only set forth the task to be performed, not the manner
in which the work is performed. (Appellant Br. at 27-28). Barker claims that the
contract gives it free reign to do whatever work it deems proper to accomplish the tasks at
hand and to charge Mr. Bushnell for any amount it desires for the work done. Barker
analogizes its contract with Bushnell and Bushnet to an attorney's contract with a client
for litigation in that "the contract does not specify what every step of the litigation will be
comprised of, it simply authorizes the attorney to take the steps he or she deems
necessary to best represent the client." (Appellant Br. at 27-28). Barker's analogy fails
to support his point. Although an attorney's contract may not specify each step the
attorney must take in pursuing litigation, the attorney's work and her fees are clearly
reviewable under the reasonable and necessary standard (see e.g., Cammack-White v.
Harbaugh, 184 P.3d 631, 635-36, (Utah Ct. App. 2008)), a standard that Barker contends
should not apply to his contact or his work performed and fees charged thereunder.

3

Although Barker states as the first issue presented for review is "[w]hether the trial court
used an incorrect legal standard to determine duties and damages under the party's [sic]
contract[,]" Barker does not address the issue directly. Barker touches on the issue
lightly in its Summary of the Argument (Appellant Br. at 6), in its argument that Barker
did not breach the contract by performing the compilation (Appellant Br. at 17), and in its
argument that it was not required to provide detailed billing (Appellant Br. at 26-28).
21
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The language of a contract is considered ambiguous if the contract language is
'insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more
plausible meanings.'" Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254,
257 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331,
681 P.2d 15, 17(1984)).
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court finds facts
regarding the parties' intentions based on evidence extrinsic to
the contract itself, those findings may not be set aside on
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a). Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464, 465
& n. 1 (Utah 1987); Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment,
745 P.2d 828 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, a trial court's
interpretation of the words of an unambiguous, integrated
contract is a question of law, which is reviewed on appeal for
correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985). See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d
892 (Utah 1988). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is
itself a question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292,1293 (Utah 1983).
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
As the court in Crowther points out, the trial court's determination that ambiguity
existed in the contract as to the work be performed by Barker and the amount that would
be charged for that work is a question of law. Therefore the first issue that must be
analyzed is whether the trial court properly concluded that the contract between the
parties is ambiguous.
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"[T]he fact that the parties differ as to the interpretation of an agreement does not
alone establish that ambiguity exists." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d at 109 (citing,
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). However, as the
court in Metropolitan Property & Liability pointed out, a contract is ambiguous if the
contract language may be "understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Id
In the present case, the contract is ambiguous as to the work to be performed under
the contract, and it is ambiguous as to the amount that Barker would be paid for the work.
The trial court found: "[o]ther than the general agreement of the task to be performed by
Barker under the Services Agreement, the Services Agreement does not specifically
indicate which work must be performed by Barker, nor does it indicate the amount that
must be paid for the work performed." (R.461]f9).
a. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Work to be Performed
Under the Contract
The Services Agreement sets forth the work to be performed under the
contract as follows:
Barker agrees to perform the following services for the
Client, including such additional services related thereto
which are reasonably required:
(a.)All requested services as set forth by Client and as understood
by Barker either express, written, or/and implied. Also, the
acceptance of all prior services and billings rendered by
Barker.
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A plain reading of the contract demonstrates that it is void of any particulars that
would allow the Court to determine what services Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet expected
Barker to perform, or what services Barker expected to perform under the contract. In
summary, the contract states that Barker will perform those services which he understood
were requested by the Client. The contract language begs for parole evidence since the
services to be performed by Barker cannot be determined by looking at the contractual
language alone. Without defining what the project is the contract states "I'll do the
project, and you'll pay me." (R.452 at 3).
Barker disagrees with the trial court's conclusion and argues that it is enough for
the contract to state that Barker was to be paid "fees on a project by project basis..."
(Appellant Br. at 11). However, without a definition as to the services that will be
performed by Barker, or even the project to be undertaken by Barker, the obligations of
Barker are ambiguous, or as the court in Metropolitan Property & Liability stated:
"[Barker's obligations may be] understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." IdTherefore, due to the fact that the terms of the contract do not define the project, or
the services to be performed by Barker, the contract is ambiguous.
b. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted that Nothing More was Due Under
the Contract
The trail court also found that the contract between the parties is ambiguous
because it does not indicate the amount Barker will charge for the work, or the hourly fee
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it will charge for performing tasks. It is proper to conclude that the payment provision of
a contract is ambiguous if the contract does not clearly define how the payments are to be
calculated.

See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 926 n.7 (Utah 2002) (the

contract was found to be ambiguous because, among other reasons, it gave no indication
of how the payments were to be calculated).
The Services Agreement states with respect to fees, in pertinent part:
As compensation for all services (Including Telephone
Conferences) rendered by Barker pursuant to this agreement,
Client shall pay to Barker on the terms and conditions
contained herein; fees on a project by project basis in which
the work performed by Barker shall constitute a major factor
and in which the ultimate outcome may be factored into the
fees charged, which fees may be adjusted annually by mutual
agreement between Client and Barker.
A plain reading of the contract demonstrates that it is void of any particulars that
would allow the Court to determine what amounts Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet owe to
Barker for his work on the undefined project. In summary, the contract states that Barker
will perform those services which he understood were requested by the client. The
contract language on fees also begs for parole evidence since the fee provision does not
define a billing rate or a flat fee, and relies upon the ambiguous services provision of the
contract as an anchor for its definition. Again, the trial court properly defined the
contract when it said it was basically an agreement that "I'll do the project, and you'll
pay me." (R.452 at 3).
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The trial court properly concluded that the contract's fees provision was
ambiguous since the amount to be paid to Barker "[may be] understood to reach two or
more plausible meanings." Metropolitan Property & Liability.
c. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Ambiguous Portions of
the Contract
After looking at the contract, the trial court properly concluded that the ambiguous
provisions were the project to be completed, the services to be performed by Barker, and
the fees to be paid to Barker. Based on parole evidence submitted at trial, the trial court
determined that there was no real dispute as to the definition of the project to be
completed because "[t]he parties agreed that the [project] to be performed by Barker was
to prepare the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, and to negotiate the payment
amounts with the IRS if necessary." (R. 461 *[} 8). However, there was a dispute between
the parties as to the services which were to be performed to complete the project, and the
amount Barker was to be paid to complete the project. (R. 452 at 2, 3; 465 ^f 38).
Therefore the trial court's task was to define the parties' intentions under the services
provision and the fee provision of the contract. The trial court determined that the
services to be performed to complete the project and the fees to be charged for those
services were to be interpreted under a reasonable and necessary standard. (R.452 at 4).
As pointed out in Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d at 465, n.l, the trial court's finding
of facts as to the parties' intentions under an ambiguous contract may not be set aside on
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appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a). Id. Barker has failed to show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous
under Rule 52(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
i. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted Barker's Duties
Under the Contract
Much of the contention between the parties lies in the amount of time spent
by Barker in "Research , Conferences, and Meetings, Etc." and in "Compilation
and Write-Up Work, Etc." Although Barker represented to Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet that he was an expert in dealing with the IRS (R. 435 at 339-40; R. 437 at
585-87), and although he only met with Mr. Bushnell two times in person, and
four or five times over the telephone (R. 436 at 515), he billed $31,020.00 to Mr.
Bushnell and Bushnet for "Research, Conferences, and Meetings, Etc."
Barker clams that the language in the contract allows him to do whatever work it
chooses to do to accomplish the task requested by the parties. (Appellant Br. at 27, 32).
Barker argues that the trial court "reform[ed] the contract" by concluding that there was a
limit as to the work it could perform. (Appellant Br. at 32). Barker argues that it was at
liberty to perform any work it deemed appropriate. (Appellant Br. at 32).
Barker arguments are incorrect. Even under the language of the contract itself,
Barker was limited to performing additional services only if they are "reasonably
required." (Services Agreement ]fl). At trial, Barker acknowledged that limitation in the
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contract. (R. 435 at 248) (acknowledging that it was charged with preparing eight tax
returns and other "required" work). Therefore, the language of the contract does not
grant Barker free reign to perform any task it deems necessary. The task must be
reasonably required. Thus, the trial court correctly used the reasonableness standard to
evaluate whether certain tasks were necessary under the contract.
Barker posits that a breach of contract can only be found if the work is "performed
outside of legal, or at a bare minimum, generally accepted standard." (Appellant Br. at
18). Therefore, Barker acknowledges that some type of reasonable standard must be
applied to its duties under the contract. Although Barker acknowledges that some
reasonable standard must be used, it would set the bar much lower than the trial court.
Thus, Barker's contention with the trial court's findings is not that it used a reasonable
standard, but that it set the bar too high when setting its reasonable standard. Even
though Barker may disagree with the trial court's definition of reasonable, it has not
shown that the trial court clearly erred by setting its bar where it did.
Barker has failed to show that the trial court's findings with respect to the work to
be performed under the contract were clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the
Compilation was not Reasonably Necessary
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Barker billed Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet $16,770 for the "Compilation and WriteUp Work, Etc." The trial court found that the compilation was not reasonable and
necessary in order to complete the project under the contract. Barker first argues that
performing the compilation was called for under the contract because u[n]othing in the
contract precludes [Barker] from providing more services than are needed." (Appellant
Br. at 17). That alone is not reason to perform the compilation. Indeed, if one follows
Barker's argument to the logical extreme, Barker could charge Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
to build a rocket to the moon because the contract does not preclude such action.
Barker's argument in this regard reveals that it treated this contract as one that
allowed it to do whatever work it desired at Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's expense.
Barker's argument misses the point. The basis for Barker's breach of contract action was
that it was obligated to prepare the compilation under the contract and

should be

compensated for the work. Therefore, the question before the trial court on Barker's
breach of contract action in this regard is whether the parties had agreed that Barker
would undertake the compilation, and whether Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet would pay
Barker for the compilation. The contract with respect to the compilation is silent; in fact,
the contract with respect to any work Barker performed is silent. {Supra at 23). The trial
court concluded that the compilation would only be considered to be an obligation under
the contract if it was reasonable and necessary to accomplish the task of preparing the tax
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returns and negotiating with the IRS. {Supra at 26). Upon weighing the evidence, the
trial court found that the compilation was not reasonable and necessary.
Barker argues that the compilation was necessary because the Quicken information
did not "tie" into the tax returns. (Appellant Br. at 25). Barker's argument fails to
connect on a number of points.
It first must be pointed out that his argument puts the cart before the horse, so to
speak. Barker's contention with the Quicken information is that the expenses in Quicken
do not tie into the expenses posted on the tax returns. (Appellant Br. at 25). However,
other than the information provided by the Quicken disk, Barker did not have Mr.
Bushnell and Bushnet's expense information prior to commencing the work on the tax
returns. Expert witness Keith Prescott testified that "[w]hat happens in these cases is the
Internal Revenue Service, of course, doesn't know what your deductions are so they list
all your income." (R. 435 at 369-70). Nothing in the information given to Barker by Mr.
Bushnell or by the IRS, would give Barker an indication that the expense information
organized by Quicken was incorrect.
In fact, the evidence suggested that the Quicken information was very reliable.
Denise Naylor testified that she has organized information and entered it into Quicken for
a number of CPAs. (R. 437 at 610). She testified that she obtained all of Mr. Bushnell's
receipts, bank statements, copies of checks, and all other financial information for the
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years 1997 through 2004 and organized the information by type. (R. 437 at 611-12).
Once the information was organized, Ms. Naylor entered all of the data into Quicken. (R.
437 at 612).
Even if one compares the Quicken information to the tax return, one would not
expect the information to tie over directly without first doing some background work.
Expert witness Keith Prescott testified that one should start with the Quicken information
and then sit down with the taxpayer and go through the information to prepare the tax
returns. (R. 436 at 397). Mr. Prescott explained that it is imperative to sit down with the
client to have an "in depth discussion of what his business and investments might be...
[because as a CPA I will never know as much about a man's business as he will
know.. .it's not possible to adequately represent a taxpayer without sitting down with that
taxpayer and understanding the documentation that they have." (R. 435 at

349, 358).

Barker had no reason to believe that the information on Quicken was incorrect because he
never sat down with Mr. Bushnell to review his receipts and inquire as to which receipts
represented business expenses and which represented personal expenses. (R. 436 at 515).
Even if the compilation was authorized, it was not properly prepared by Barker
because no one ever sat down with Mr. Bushnell to discuss his business and his various
expenses. Without discussing those issues with Mr. Bushnell, Barker had no way of
knowing which receipts were personal expenses and which were business expenses.
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In fact, a review of the tax returns, the Quicken data, and the compilation prepared
by Barker reveal that the Quicken information ties into the tax returns more closely than
the compilations prepared by Barker. (R. 435 at 372 - 388). With all of the work Barker
claims went into the compilation and the enormous amount of fees charged by Barker for
this work, one would expect the compilation number to tie directly into the tax returns.
(R. 435 at 389).
Due to the fact that the compilations were not necessary to complete Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet's tax returns, the trial court correctly concluded that the Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet are not obligated to pay Barker for preparation of the compilations Further, the
fact that the compilations do not tie into the tax returns also supports the trial court's
conclusion that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet do not have an obligation to pay for Barker for
the compilation's preparation.
2. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Barker
failed to show that the "Research, Conferences, and
Meetings, Etc." were Reasonable and Necessary
Barker charged Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet $31,020 for "Research, Conferences,
Meetings, and Correspondences, Etc." The trial court concluded that it was unable to
conclude that the research, conferences, and meetings were reasonable and necessary to
accomplish the project agreed to by the parties. (R. 452 at 5-6). This issue is more fully
discussed in the following section. To prevent a duplication of the argument here, it is
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sufficient to say that Barker failed to show through its billings that the research,
conferences and meetings were reasonable and necessary to prepare Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet's tax returns and to negotiate with the IRS. Without significant details in the
billing statements (of which there is little or none), the trial court found that it was
unreasonable that a CPA would charge a client over $30,000 for research, conferences,
and meetings.
ii. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Mr, Bushnell and
Bushnet did not Owe any Additional Fees to Barker
As previously discussed, the trial court was required to interpret the fees provision
of the contract due to obvious ambiguities in that provision.. Barker argues that the trial
court erred in finding that there was not sufficient evidence to support his claim for its
fees because Barker had provided evidence of the work performed and the amount
charged for that work. Barker's argument fails to properly identify the trial court's
reasoning in finding that the evidence did not support Barker's claim for breach of
contract. The trial court found that under an ambiguous contract such as the one at issue,
it is the plaintiffs burden to show that the fees he is seeking are reasonable and
necessary." (R. 452 at 3, 4). The trial court then found that it was not shown by Barker
that it was entitled to be paid more than it had already been paid by Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet. Therefore, although evidence had been presented that demonstrated that Barker
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billed Mr. Bushnell for work performed, that evidence did not establish that the work was
done and that it was reasonable and necessary to accomplish the task contacted for.
The trial court found that the Plaintiff billed Bushnell and Bushnet $64,355.20 (see
supra note 2). (R. 464 lj 35; R. 452 at 4). The trial court further found that the amount
that had been paid on those bills was $32,500.00 (see supra note 2). (R. 465 ^j 36; R. 452
at 4-5).4 The trial court pointed out that the issue before it was whether the work
performed by Barker was reasonably and necessary to perform the task to be performed.

4

Barker treats the billings to Mr. Bushnell and the payments credited to Mr. Bushnell
separately from the billings to Bushnet and the payments credited to Bushnet. However,
the trial court did not treat the billings and payment credits for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
separately. There is a good reason for the court's decision onto to separate the Bushnell
billings and payments from the Bushnet billings and payments.
A review of the billings and payments as compared to the work billed for reveals
that Barker applied payments by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet to one account or the other
arbitrarily. For example, all work toward the compilation was billed under Bushnet,
however, Barker argues (and admitted at trial) that the compilation was necessary to
prepare Mr. BushnelPs tax returns correctly. (Appellant Br. at 29-31; R. 435 at 248) (Mr.
Barker testifying that spending 30 to 35 hours per return is reasonable considering they
were "forensic type returns"). Further, a review of the billing to Bushnet shows that
many of the payments applied to Bushnet could have (or arguably should have) been
applied to Mr. Bushnell. For example, Barker paid the IRS $12,680.20 in behalf of John
K. Bushnell for amounts owing on his taxes from the years 1995 and 1996. However, the
charge for that payment, and the application of Mr. Bushnell's reimbursement check to
Barker for that amount was placed on Bushnet's account. It is also interesting to note,
that even though the contract between Barker and Bushnet was not signed until
September 2005, $20,320.00 in payments received prior to September of 2005 were
applied to Bushnet's account.
Barker fails to recognize the good reasons the court did not distinguish between
the billings and payment credits of Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet, and Barker fails to
marshal the evidence supporting those good reasons.
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In determining whether the work performed for the amount billed was reasonable and
necessary, the trial court found that there were two general categories of the billings: the
general category of "research, conferences, meetings, etc.," and the "compilation"
category.
In reviewing these two categories, the trial court found that it could not conclude
that amount billed under the category of "research, conference, meetings, etc." was
reasonable and necessary; therefore, even though it could conclude that work was bill for,
it could not find that the work done was reasonable and necessary beyond that which was
paid. (R. 466 Ht 45, 46; R. 452 at 5-6).
Barker argues that the trial court erred because its Exhibit 50 contained more
detailed information, thus suggesting that the trial court should have categorized the bills
into more than two categories. Barker's argument fails for a number of reasons. First,
Barker does not show that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling.
The trial court stated that its finding was based upon the deficiency of the detail in the
billing records, and the fact that there was no additional evidence to support the claim
that Barker was entitled to more money than that which he was paid. (R. 452 at 4-6).
Although the Court does not specifically refer to any exhibits in its ruling, it is assumed
that it took into consideration all the exhibits prior to its ruling. For that reason, without a
marshaling of the evidence by Barker to show that there is insufficient evidence to
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support the claim, it must be assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial
court. See Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 190 P.3d 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) ("because Wife
fails to marshal the evidence in support of this finding, we must assume that the finding is
adequately supported by the evidence."). Nevertheless, even if one is to look into the
record and Exhibit 50, it is clearly identifiable that there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that the research, conferences, and meetings were reasonable and necessary to
accomplish the project under the contract. A review of the entries in Exhibit 50 does not
shed light upon the question of whether the work was reasonable and necessary to
complete the task to be performed by Barker. Therefore, Exhibit 50 does not add any
additional information sufficient to disturb the trial court's ruling.
d. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Acknowledgement of
Fees signed by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet was not a Waiver
Barker argues that the trial court ignored evidence that Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet accepted the charges as made.

(Appellant Br. At 32).

Barker's

contention is based in Exhibits 66 through 74, which are a series of letters
prepared by Barker and signed by Bushnell. The letters contain the statement "it
is acknowledged and again accepted all the terms of your standard Acceptance of
Service Agreement and we hereby reinitiate all terms and conditions of that
agreement . . . those terms and conditions include but are not limited to the
acceptance of all billings and services to date." Barker argues that Mr. Bushnell
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and Bushnet waived their right to contest the billing amount by signing letters with
the above language indicating acceptance.
The trial court considered Barker's argument in this regard in its ruling.

It

concluded that the letters do not constitute a waiver because a waiver would
require more specificity than the blanket statement "I'm going to pay the bill." On
that basis, the trial court found that there was not a knowing waiver of that right by
acceptance. (R. 452 at 8-9).
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's, Inc.
v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted). The question of waiver is "intensely fact dependent." IHC
Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 73 P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003).
"[U]nlike most cases, the legal conclusions underlying a trial court's grant of
summary judgment on a waiver issue are reviewed with some measure of
deference." Id
In order to show that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had relinquished a right,
Barker had to show (1) there was an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) there
was knowledge of the existing right, benefit, or advantage; and (3) there was an
intent to relinquish the right, benefit, or advantage. Soter's 857 P.2d at 940.
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The question surrounding this issue is whether Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
accepted the tax returns and the work done to prepare the tax returns by signing
the letters.

It would have been impossible for Mr. Barker and Bushnet to

knowingly waive their right to contest the accuracy of the tax returns or the work
done to prepare the tax returns. At trial, Mr. Bushnell testified that he did not have
an understanding as to why he was signing the letters. (R. 437 at 579). In fact,
due to Barker's rush to get the tax returns filed, Mr. Bushnell did not have a
chance to review the letter or his tax returns before they were filed. (R. 436 at 512
- 17). Without the opportunity to review the tax returns, or take them to another
expert to verify that the work was done correctly, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet could
not have waived their right to contest the work through acceptance.
Therefore, due to the fact that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not understand
why they were signing the letters, and due to the fact that they did not have
sufficient time to review the work at that point, the trial court correctly concluded
that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not waive their right to dispute the fees charged
by Barker by singing the letters contained in Exhibits 66 through 74.
VI.

BARKER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
Barker argues that its due process rights were violated because the trial court

dismissed the bases of Appellee's counterclaim for breach of contract in its Rule 50
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motion. (Appellant Br. at 16). Barker argues that the trial court dismissed several bases
for the Appellee's counterclaim when it commented in its denial of Barker's Rule 50
motion that there was a question as to "whether the contract has been breached because
Mr. Barker has in an unprofessional manner, unnecessary unreasonably did this
compilation." (R. 437 at 705). Barker is incorrect.
Barker sought to discharge Mr. Bushnell's cause of action for breach of contract
through Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.. Rule 50(a) allows a party to
move for directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. Generally,
a Rule 50(a) motion is reserved for only a jury trial since the motion contemplates the
court to direct the jury to return a verdict for a party. Grossen v. DeWitt 982 P.2d 581,
584 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, a motion brought under Rule 50(a) in a bench trial
is considered under Rule 41(b). Id Rule 41(b) states that
[ajfter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without
a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may
then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff
or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all
the evidence.

The trial court, by denying the Barker's motion, declined to render any judgment until the
close of all the evidence. Id Therefore, by declining to render any judgment on the
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breach of contract claim until the close of evidence, the breach of contract claim
remained intact.

In fact, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "every

final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." In this case Mr.
Bushnell had demanded relief for breach of contract and had introduced evidence to
support the claim. The court relied upon sufficient evidence in its finding and found that
Plaintiff had breached its contract.
Even if a court were able to dismiss the various bases for a cause of action under
Rule 41, the trial court did not limit itself in this instance. In rendering its decision on
Barker's request for dismissal of Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim, the trial court stated that
Barker was to perform these services in a workmanlike
manner and that he failed to do that, that he missed deadlines,
that - but more specifically, he performed a services that was
unnecessary and unreasonable. It was the compilation of the
records that hew as given, a compilation of those records. So
he breached the agreement in several ways in an
unworkmanlike manner but specifically I think for this
analysis the claim comes down to this and that is you
performed a compilation at some considerable expense and
consideration number of hours and that was unnecessary and
not reasonable in light of the circumstances and
consequentially was not a workmanlike job in dealing with
tax returns.
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(R. 437 at 701). Although the trial court focused its comments on the compilation, it is
clear that it was also contemplating the other claims for breach of contract such as the
missed deadlines and the inaccurate preparation of Bushnell's tax returns.
VII. BARKER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH MR. BUSHNELL AND
BUSHNET
The trial court found that Barker failied to perform the tasks under the contract
in a workman like manner by failing to meet deadlines that it had agreed upon with the
IRS, failing to meet other dedlies set by the IRS, failing to prevent federal tax liens from
being recorded against Mr. Bushnell's property, failing to prepare th 1999 tax return, and
failing toproperly prepare the 2004 tax return." R. 468 at ^f 55). Barker argues that the
breaches mentioned by the trail court do not constitute a breach of contract as a matter of
law. (Appellant Br. at 18-20).
Barker first argues that the it was not an error to file the tax returns late because
the contract did not specify a specific date when they needed to be filed. (Appellant Br.
at 18). As pointed out above, the contract is ambiguous as to the obligations of the
parties. However, the trial court determined trough parole evidence that the task to be
performed was to prepare the tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, negotiate with
the IRS, and specifically to avoid the filing of federal tax liens.
After making initial contact with the IRS, Barker agreed upon a deadline of June
24, 2005 to submit the tax returns to the IRS. (R. 434 at 154). Barker was not able to
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meet that deadline and so he wrote a letter on June 22, 2005 to request an extension of
time to file. (R. 434 at 167). Barker failed to file the tax returns by August 19, 2005. (R.
434 at 167-68). Barker did not receive an extension of the August 19, 2005 deadline.
Due to missing that deadline, the IRS served a summons on Mr. Bushnell and escalated
their enforcement of the collections against Mr. Bushnell. That event, coupled with a
number of subsequent events led to the filing of federal tax liens on Mr. Bushnell's
property. Barker, claiming to be an expert with dealing with the IRS, had agreed to
prepare and submit the tax returns, and to negotiate with the IRS. By failing to file the
tax returns by the agreed upon date, Barker breached his agreement with Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet in this regard.
Barker argues that the filing of the 1999 tax return with an error in the reporting
of income was not a breach of contract. (Appellant Br. at 18-19). Barker's argument is
not clear, but he appears to take the position that the error could have been remedied
quickly with notice, and therefore it was not a breach of the contract. Barker's argument
fails to explain why Barker's failure to properly prepare the 1999 tax return is not a
breach of the parties' contract. Barker had agreed to prepare Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's
tax returns, Barker failed to prepare the 1999 tax return correctly, and therefore he
breached his contract. Mr. Bushnell later had to hire the services of another CPA to
handle the mistake.
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Barker argues that it did not breach its contract with Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet
by indicating that Bushnet was a S corporation on Mr. Bushnell's 2004 tax return.
(Appellant Br. at 19). Barker argues that it is not a mistake because one may make a
retroactive S election. Nevertheless, Barker failed to make the retroactive S election and
therefore the tax return was filed in error. (R. 435 at 274). Since Barker failed to
properly prepare Mr. Bushnell's 2004 tax return by showing that Bushnet was an S
corporation, it breached its contract with Mr. Bushnell. Further, it should be noted that
even after going to the extensive effort of preparing the compilation for Bushnet, Barker
failed to properly prepare the tax return for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet.
As to the final point, Barker argues that he was not at fault for the filing of the
tax liens because Mr. Bushnell said he did not have enough money to pay the past taxes
and the current taxes as well. (Appellant Br. at 20). This is a classic instance where
Barker fails to marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings. Mr. Bushnell
testified that he repeatedly told Barker that he had the money to pay the taxes owing. (R.
436 at 497-98). He also testified that he relied upon Barker to tell him when to pay the
taxes. (R. 437 at 578). Even though Mr. Bushnell had the money to pay, Barker advised
him not to pay the taxes so that it had leverage to negotiate some of the penalties and
interest owing. (R. 436 at 523). Therefore, the evidence relied upon by the trial court
establishes that Mr. Bushnell had the money to pay his past taxes but did not pay them
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due to the fact that Barker advised him not to pay immediately. Mr. Bushnell did not pay
the taxes immediately and the IRS filed a tax lien against his property. Barker breached
his contract with Mr. Bushnell by advising him not to pay the amounts owing to the IRS.
VIII. THE ATTONEY FEES AWARDED TO MR. BUSHNELL AND
BUSHNET WERE AWARDED PROPERLY PURSUANT TO THE
CONTRACT
Barker argues that the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mr. Bushnell was
excessive. The award of attorney fees to Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were made pursuant
to the parties' contract. Further, the amount of the attorney fees awarded was not
excessive.
a. Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had a Right to Attorney Fees Under the
Contract
Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party when they are provided by
statute or by contract. See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah
1994). Additionally, in the absence of statute or a contract providing for attorney fees,
courts may award attorney fees when justice or equity requires. Id Pursuant to the
contract between the parties, Mr. Bushnell has a contractual right to costs and attorney
fees relating to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim.
The contract provision at issue states "In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the
non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing
this Agreement or in seeking any other remedy." (Service Agreement ^f 8). In order to
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determine whether Mr. Bushnell is entitled to attorney fees, this provision must be
interpreted.
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84
P.3d 1134, 1141(Utah 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Paragraph 8 of
the Services Agreement is unambiguous. It provides that the non-defaulting party shall
be entitled to all costs and attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement or in seeking
any other remedy.
The court may look at the two causes of action together to determine which party is
the non-defaulting party and entitled to attorney fees. See Mountain States Broadcasting
Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (looked at result of primary
claim and counterclaim to determine which party was the "prevailing party."). That
approach clarifies the issue: Barker brought a cause of action against Mr. Bushnell for
breach of contract, and Mr. Bushnell brought a cause of action against Barker for breach
of contract. After a full trial, the Court determined that Barker breached the contract and
that Bushnell did not breach the contract. Therefore, pursuant to the contract, Mr.
Bushnell is entitled to his costs and attorney fees incurred in the action as a matter of
right.
45
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b. The Amount of Attorney Fees Awarded was not Excessive
The trial court awarded Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet all of their attorney fees
relating to the defense of the breach of contract action brought by Barker, and it awarded
to Mr. Bushnell all of his attorney fees for pursuing his beach of contract action brought
against Barker. The total amount awarded for attorney fees was $79,108.50.
Barker argues that it was not reasonable to have two attorneys working on
Bushnell's case, and that the due to the "relative lack of complexity involved in this
matter" the attorney fees should be reduced. (Appellant Br. at 35). It is interesting to
note that although Barker is now calling foul regarding the amount of fees awarded to
Mr. Bushnell, Barker requested the Court to award to it over $81,523.50 for "BILLING
TIME DURING LAST TWO YEARS IN PREPARING FOR COURT." (R. 434 at 109,
Addendum 1). Considering the fact that Barker claimed that it necessarily billed over
$64,000.00 to get Mr. Bushnell's tax returns ready for the IRS, it would seem that it had a
very intimate knowledge of the case. Even with that intimate knowledge, Barker billed
another $81,523.50 for "the charges of time since we've been trying to resolve the
matter." (R. 434 at 108). In light of that fact alone, it is noteworthy that Mr. Bushnell
and Bushnet's attorneys, who had no previous knowledge of the case prior to their
involvement, billed only $79,108.50 to litigate the case completely. Further, it is likewise
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noteworthy that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's accounting professionals, with no previous
knowledge of the case, billed only $25,180.45.
Barker takes issue with some of the specific billing for attorney fees. Barker
argues that the trial court should not have awarded Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet attorney
fees in the amount of $1,048.50 for "pre complaint [sic] services." (Appellant Br. at 34).
It is not clear as to which fees Barker objects specifically, but it is assumed that the
dispute includes all fees from April 11, 2006 through June 13, 2006. However, it should
be noted that the sum of those fees equals $ 1,204.50.
Barker's argument fails under the provision of the contract, which provides that
" . . . the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in
enforcing this agreement or in seeking any other remedy." (Appellant Br. at Addendum
D). Even though the $1,048.50 in attorney fees complained of by Barker were not
incurred after the Complaint had been filed, they were incurred in connection with
enforcing the agreement.
Barker argues that there were seven entries that it believes only pertain to the
Third-Party Complaint. Of the seven entries contested by Barker, only three of them
should not have been included. The entry on 7/12/06 by JW to "Review & Revise
Complaint, Countercomplaint" is properly included in the request for fees since Mr.
Bushnell is entitle to an award of the costs and attorney fees relating to Barker claim and
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his counterclaim. The entry on 7/14/06 by RL to "finalize Barker Summons and arrange
for its service" should not have been included since it only pertains to the Third-Party
Complaint. The entry on 8/01/06 by JW for "Tel conf w/ client; Tel conf w/ D. Coulter
re additional Plaintiffs against Barker conf w/ D. Hirschi" are proper since the discussion
related to work done by Barker. Further, even if some of the information related to Mr.
Barker, it was so inextricably linked to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim
that it should be included. The entry on 8/10/06 by JW to Review Answer of Barker; Tel
conf w/ Turner; Review Scheduling Order" is proper because Barker's Answer to the
counterclaim, the telephone conference with Barker's counsel and a review of the
scheduling order relate to Barker claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim or involve
issues that are so inextricably linked to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim
that it should be included. The entry on 4/1/08 by AMW for the "preparation of motion
for directed verdict. Research regarding speculative damages" should be included
because it relates directly to Barker's complaint and the Rule 50 Motion that was made at
the close of Barker's case. The entry on 4/02/08 and 4/03/08 should not have been
included because they only relate to the Third-Party Complaint against Mr. Barker. Mr.
Moss has prepared an Amended Declaration which has removed the improper inclusion
of the entries on 7/14/06, 4/02/08, and 4/03/08.
///
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IX.

THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT
EXCESSIVE

As stated above, it is interesting to note that although Barker is now calling foul
regarding the costs awarded to Mr. Bushnell, Barker requested the Court to award to it
over $81,523.50 for its time spent in pursuing the action. It is also interesting to note that
the $81,523.50 represents time spent Barker, who was already familiar with the case.
The contract under which the cause of action is based states that "In the event of a
breach of this Agreement, the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement or in seeking any other remedy."
(Service Agreement ]f 8; attached hereto as exhibit A). Expert witness fees are allowed
by the contract by its inclusion of the language "all costs." The fees paid to an expert
witness to prepare, attend, and testify at trial is a cost incurred to enforce (or defend) the
agreement.
X.

MR. BUSHNELL AND BUSHNET ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS'
FEESONAPPEAL
It is undisputed that the Agreements contain a provision for attorneys' fees.

(Addendum D "Acceptance of Service Agreement" at *[[8) The Trial Court awarded Mr.
Bushnell and Bushnet their attorneys' fees in the case below. (R. 472). It is well
established that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah
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Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991); citing
Management Servs. V. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-9 (Utah 1980); see also
Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, Mr. Bushnell and
Bushnet hereby request that this Court award them the reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs they has incurred in this appeal.
VII.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet respectfully request that

Barker's appeal be denied, that this Court uphold the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment issued by the trial court, and that this Court award
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this appeal as per the
terms of the Agreement.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2009.
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

s/ Brennan H. Moss
David P. Hirschi
Brennan H. Moss
Attorneys for Appellees
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I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
on the 6th day of April, 2009 I caused two true and correct copies of APPELLEE'S
BRIEF to be be mailed first-class, postage prepaid to the following:

Shawn D. Turner
LARSON TURNER DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C.

1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Attorney for Plaintiff
I further certify that pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, on the
6h day of April, 2009 I caused a digital copy of APPELLEE'S BRIEF in searchable
PDF format to be mailed first-class, postage prepaid to the following:
Shawn D. Turner
LARSON TURNER DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C.

1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATED this 6th day of April, 2009.
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

s/ Brennan H. Moss
David P. Hirschi
Brennan H. Moss
Attorneys for Appellees
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